MemForge was deprecated on 2026-11-16 and is no longer maintained. No version receives security fixes, and no patched release will be published.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| All | No |
There is no security support. If you want other users warned about a vulnerability, you can still open a private security advisory. It may be published as a warning, but no fix will follow. Please do not open a public issue.
These are not going to be fixed. If you still run MemForge, plan around them and migrate:
- No authentication unless you configure it. If neither
MEMFORGE_TOKENnor OAuth2 is set, every/memory/*route accepts unauthenticated requests. The standalone image does not set a token, and the shipped Docker Compose file does not passMEMFORGE_TOKENthrough from.env; add it to thememforgeservice'senvironment:block yourself. - A token is not bound to an agent. Any caller with a valid token can read and write every agent's memory. Treat everyone who holds the token as one trust domain.
- PostgreSQL row-level security is not enforced on the application's own database connection. Isolation between agents rests on query predicates only.
- Audit-chain verification is unreliable. It can report tampering on healthy data, and concurrent writers can fork the chain.
- The PyPI name
memforgebelongs to an unrelated project. Never runpip install memforge.
The sections below describe the design as documented while the project was maintained. Where they conflict with this list, this list is correct.
/memory/*endpoints require Bearer token authentication only whenMEMFORGE_TOKENor OAuth2 is configured (see Known unfixed limitations)- Admin endpoints (
/admin/*) use a separateADMIN_TOKEN - Token comparison uses
crypto.timingSafeEqualto prevent timing attacks - Token validation results are cached for 30 seconds to reduce overhead
- Scope-based authorization:
memforge:readfor GET operations,memforge:writefor POST operations - Agent scoping: all queries include
agent_idpredicates, but the caller chooses theagent_id, so this is not isolation between callers (see Known unfixed limitations)
- Agent IDs are validated against a strict pattern:
^[\w.@:=-]{1,256}$ - All user-supplied SQL parameters use parameterized queries (no string interpolation)
- Request bodies are validated for required fields, types, and range constraints
- Rate limiting is applied to all
/memoryroutes (configurable viaRATE_LIMIT_MAX)
- The Swagger UI helper uses explicit HTML entity escaping (
escapeHtml) - JavaScript string literals in rendered HTML use
escapeJsStringwith<→\x3cencoding - The cache dashboard uses DOM API manipulation instead of
innerHTML
- No PII-specific handling is built in — MemForge stores whatever content you send it
- Cold tier provides an audit trail but does not implement hard deletion
- Database connections use connection pooling with configurable limits
- Minimal dependency surface: Express, pg, redis, prom-client, express-rate-limit
- No external SDK dependencies for LLM providers — direct HTTP calls to APIs
- MCP server uses no external MCP SDK — minimal protocol implementation
-
LLM Prompt Injection: Memory content is passed to LLMs during consolidation, reflection, and revision. Malicious content stored as memories could influence LLM behavior. Mitigation: system prompts are hardcoded and instruct the LLM to only work with provided content.
-
Bearer Token Storage: Tokens are stored in environment variables. In production, use a secrets manager rather than
.envfiles. -
Redis Cache: Cached responses are stored in plaintext in Redis. If Redis is accessible to untrusted parties, sensitive memory content could be exposed. Use Redis ACLs and network isolation in production.
-
Database: Memory content is stored in plaintext in PostgreSQL. Use PostgreSQL's built-in encryption features (pgcrypto) or disk-level encryption for sensitive deployments.
-
No HTTPS: The server runs plain HTTP. Deploy behind a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy) with TLS termination in production.
- Set strong, unique values for
MEMFORGE_TOKENandADMIN_TOKEN - Run behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy
- Restrict Redis access with ACLs and network policies
- Use PostgreSQL SSL mode (
?sslmode=requirein DATABASE_URL) - Set
RATE_LIMIT_MAXappropriate to your workload - Disable
AUTO_REGISTER_AGENTSif agents should be explicitly provisioned - Review and restrict CORS if exposing to browser clients
- Monitor
/metricsendpoint for anomalous request patterns - Rotate tokens periodically
- Back up the database — cold tier archival is not a backup strategy