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gcs: Expose transparency-trust-list-base64 in security-context based on injected TTLs - #2991
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Tingmao Wang (micromaomao) wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Tingmao Wang (micromaomao) wants to merge 1 commit into
Tingmao Wang (micromaomao) wants to merge 1 commit into
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…on injected TTLs In order to enable the application to provide with a relying party a full set of transparent endorsements, we also expose a "first party" TTL in the security context that we believe allows verification of the transparent UVM reference info and TCB reference info. Such a TTL will be delivered via the fragment injection mechanism like for TTLs for transparent fragments, and GCS identifies such a TTL via hard-coded issuer and subject strings. When such a TTL is injected, it is used to populate the transparency-trust-list-base64 file on next container start. Using it as the content of transparency-trust-list-base64 is the only "special treatment" applied to such TTLs. GCS does not otherwise give it any more trust than allowed by the policy. COSE signature and issuer certificate checks are applied to all injected TTLs, before this matching is done. A malformed or not-correctly-signed TTL would not be used for the security context file even if the COSE envelope header claims the correct issuer and subject. Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot Signed-off-by: Tingmao Wang <tingmaowang@microsoft.com>
Amaury Chamayou (achamayou)
approved these changes
Nov 18, 2026
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🟡 Changes recommended
The new first-party TTL selection and export path lacks regression coverage for matching, SVN ordering, invalid-input cache preservation, and export behavior after policy rejection or in TTL-only cases.
1 open issue
What changed in this PR
This PR exposes an injected first-party transparency trust list (TTL) in the container security context, allowing applications to provide it alongside reference information to relying parties without granting it additional policy trust.
Changes:
- Defines the
transparency-trust-list-base64filename. - Caches validated TTLs matching designated issuer/subject pairs, retaining the highest received SVN.
- Exports the cached COSE bytes as base64 when creating a container’s security context.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
pkg/securitypolicy/securitypolicy.go |
Adds the TTL security-context filename constant. |
pkg/securitypolicy/securitypolicy_options.go |
Adds TTL matching, synchronized caching, SVN ordering, and security-context export. |
Review effort: Balanced
Comment on lines
+413
to
+415
| if len(s.transparencyTrustList) == 0 || s.transparencyTrustListSVN <= *svnFromCwt { | ||
| s.transparencyTrustList = append(s.transparencyTrustList[:0], raw...) | ||
| s.transparencyTrustListSVN = *svnFromCwt |
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In order to enable the application to provide with a relying party a full set of transparent endorsements, we also expose a "first party" TTL in the security context that we believe allows verification of the transparent UVM reference info and TCB reference info. Such a TTL will be delivered via the fragment injection mechanism like for TTLs for transparent fragments, and GCS identifies such a TTL via hard-coded issuer and subject strings. When such a TTL is injected, it is used to populate the transparency-trust-list-base64 file on next container start.
Using it as the content of transparency-trust-list-base64 is the only "special treatment" applied to such TTLs. GCS does not otherwise give it any more trust than allowed by the policy.
COSE signature and issuer certificate checks are applied to all injected TTLs, before this matching is done. A malformed or not-correctly-signed TTL would not be used for the security context file even if the COSE envelope header claims the correct issuer and subject.
Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot