diff --git a/server/pkg/handler/handler.go b/server/pkg/handler/handler.go index aff61de..437a9f2 100644 --- a/server/pkg/handler/handler.go +++ b/server/pkg/handler/handler.go @@ -241,10 +241,7 @@ func ipFromForwardedHeader(ctx *fasthttp.RequestCtx) string { } func (h *handler) Serve() error { - rateLimitMiddleware, err := newRateLimitMiddleware(h.trustProxy) - if err != nil { - return err - } + rateLimitMiddleware := newRateLimitMiddleware(h.trustProxy) requestHandler := func(ctx *fasthttp.RequestCtx) { log.Debug().Msgf("%s %s", ctx.Method(), ctx.RequestURI()) diff --git a/server/pkg/handler/ratelimit.go b/server/pkg/handler/ratelimit.go index e824bda..87c82c3 100644 --- a/server/pkg/handler/ratelimit.go +++ b/server/pkg/handler/ratelimit.go @@ -115,12 +115,12 @@ type rateLimitMiddleware struct { // value, which identifies the real client. Never enable trustProxy in // front of an untrusted hop: any client could then forge a fresh "IP" per // request and defeat the per-client DoS throttle. -func newRateLimitMiddleware(trustProxy bool) (*rateLimitMiddleware, error) { +func newRateLimitMiddleware(trustProxy bool) *rateLimitMiddleware { keyGetter := remoteAddrKey if trustProxy { keyGetter = forwardedIPKey } - return &rateLimitMiddleware{limiter: newRateLimiter(), keyGetter: keyGetter}, nil + return &rateLimitMiddleware{limiter: newRateLimiter(), keyGetter: keyGetter} } // Handle wraps next with rate limiting: requests that exceed the key's diff --git a/server/pkg/handler/ratelimit_test.go b/server/pkg/handler/ratelimit_test.go index 786e871..7d87a10 100644 --- a/server/pkg/handler/ratelimit_test.go +++ b/server/pkg/handler/ratelimit_test.go @@ -15,10 +15,7 @@ import ( func startRateLimitedServer(t *testing.T, trustProxy bool) string { t.Helper() - middleware, err := newRateLimitMiddleware(trustProxy) - if err != nil { - t.Fatalf("newRateLimitMiddleware(%v): %v", trustProxy, err) - } + middleware := newRateLimitMiddleware(trustProxy) next := func(ctx *fasthttp.RequestCtx) { ctx.SetBodyString("ok")